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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates claims that classical Ayurveda was scientific, in a modern 
western sense, and that the many religious and magical elements found in the 
texts were all either stale Vedic remnants or later brahminic impositions. It 
argues (1) that Ayurveda did not manifest standard criteria of ‘science’ (e.g., 
materialism, empirical observation, experimentation, falsification, 
quantification, or a developed conception of proof) and (2) that Vedic aspects 
of the classical texts are too central to be considered inauthentic or marginal. 
These points suggest that attempting to apply the modern western categories 
of ‘science’ and ‘religion’ to ancient South Asian medical texts at best obscures 
more important issues and, at worst, imports inappropriate orientalist 
assumptions. Having set aside the distraction of ‘science’ vs. ‘religion’ in 
classical Ayurveda, the paper finds support for claims that brahminic elements 
were later additions to the texts. It concludes by arguing that this is best 
explained not in terms of a conceptual tension between religion and science 
but in terms of social and economic tensions between physicians and 
brahmins.  
 
 
 
The status of science in non-western cultures is a small but growing 
sub-field of the study of relations between science and religion (Peterson 
2000, 19; cf. Harding 1998; Selin 1997; Goonatilake 1992). This raises 
questions regarding the scope and value of the terms ‘science’ and ‘religion’ as 
used in historical and cross-cultural studies. Ayurveda, the ancient South 
Asian medical tradition, provides a useful case study. This paper examines a 
variety of claims that Ayurveda was truly empirical, rational, or scientific and 
that elements of religion and magic in the texts were minor, non-essential, or 
inauthentic. Evaluating these claims will contribute to a broader framework 
within which issues of non-western science and religion can be discussed. 
Several scholars argue that Ayurveda was scientific and that the many 
religious and magical elements found in the texts were either stale Vedic 
remnants or later brahminic impositions that sought to repress Ayurveda’s 
revolutionary empiricism: “In a tradition dominated by the pundits, Ayurveda 
. . . represent[s] the seeds of secular thought. True, this secularism is almost 
immediately repressed, normalized, impregnated with a religious vocabulary” 
(Zimmermann 1987, 212). Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya argues that “In ancient 
India, the only discipline that promises to be fully secular and contains clear 
potentials of the modern understanding of natural science is medicine”; and 
he claims that the “magico-religious” aspects of the texts are “alien elements” 
and “later grafts” (1977, 2-4; cf. 1986, 30-35). G. Jan Meulenbeld suggests that 
brahminic domination is the reason that Ayurveda was unable to pursue its 
empirical course of modifying theories in the light of observed anomalies 
(1987, 4-5). For Kenneth Zysk, remnants of magical elements attest to 
Ayurveda’s Vedic origins, and a veneer of brahminic elements attest to the 
“hinduization process” that brought it into the fold of orthodoxy (1991, 118). 
According to these views, the classical texts consist of distinct layers: 
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authentic Ayurveda—empirical, rational, and scientific—and one or more 
inauthentic and ill-fitting religious strata. 
Several characteristics of science play a role in these claims: (1) 
reductive materialism in the characterization of health and disease, the make-
up of the human body, and the function of medicinal substances; (2) the role 
of empirical observation and inference in diagnostic practice and as a factor 
in theory modification; (3) theoretical rationality as indicated both by a 
formal conceptualization of anomalies and by a non-deterministic view of 
action (situating empirical therapeutics within a more open sense of ‘karma’); 
and (4) evidence of rudimentary professionalization among ayurvedic 
physicians.  
Religion, as the Other of these arguments, refers both to Vedic 
tradition, which predates Ayurveda, and Brahminism, which was undergoing 
important changes as Ayurveda developed.i The religion of the brahmins 
shifted over a period of centuries from an exclusive emphasis on conducting 
Vedic sacrifices to include supervision of new devotional rituals, often in the 
temples that emerged in the early medieval period (Wolpert 1989, 37-87). 
These two related religious traditions are characterized to a large extent by 
normative ideas, practices, and social structures as set out in two sets of 
scriptures: (1) the Vedas, dating from well before the development of 
Ayurveda, which include a vibrant polytheism, an emphasis on rituals to 
maintain the natural and social order, the correlated high status of the priestly 
(brahminic) caste, religio-magical protections from harm and diseases (e.g., 
spells and amulets), astrology, and a complex symbolism linking food, 
cooking, divinity, ritual and salvation; and (2) the Upanishads, (elaborated 
slightly earlier than the ayurvedic texts) which developed the concepts of 
reincarnation, karma (the positive or negative causal influence of previous 
actions, including those from past lives), and moksha (salvation by liberation 
from the karmic cycle of rebirth and redeath). Elements of all these religious 
views are present in the classical ayurvedic texts.  
 This paper challenges the way these issues have been framed. The first 
section of the paper offers a brief overview of Ayurveda, and the second 
section considers claims that the tradition was scientific and finds these 
claims to be untenable. The weaker claim that Ayurveda had certain empirical 
characteristics is well supported. The third section of the paper looks at the 
place of religion in Ayurveda, finding that Vedic religious elements are too 
central to be excluded, but that brahminic elements may well be later 
impositions. Hence, the frequent claim that Ayurveda was science in 
categorical opposition to religion is misdirected. The opposition was not 
between science and religion, but between two traditions: an ancient medical 
tradition, with its Vedic elements and empirical tendencies, and a certain type 
of religion, brahminism. The fourth section of the paper considers the 
implications of the fact that a modern opposition between the categories of 
science and religion has been imposed on these ancient medical texts. The 
recent academic search for a truly scientific (hence, non-religious) core in 
Ayurveda is suspiciously similar to the privileging of ‘modern science’ over 
‘traditional religion’ in orientalist discourses. This leads us to question the use 
of these categories not as descriptors of abstract belief systems—distinguished 
by their degree of resemblance to modern thought—but as strategic levers in 
ideological struggles. Historical and comparative studies suggest that ‘magic’ 
often functions as a means of isolating an illegitimate realm from the 
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legitimate realm of ‘religion’ (Benavides 1997). I suggest that the terms 
‘science’ and ‘religion,’ as used in discussions of classical Ayurveda, highlight 
competing positions in just such a social and material struggle for legitimacy. 
That is, the claim that Ayurveda was ‘science’ (notwithstanding its essentially 
religious elements) characterizes its historical competition with a specific sort 
of religion. The modern academic use of these terms directs our gaze to 
ideological and material issues not to a free-floating distinction between 
rationality and superstition. Following this line of thought, the final section of 
the paper redraws the lines of tension found within the two main ayurvedic 
texts: from tension between religion and science to that between ayurvedic 
physicians and brahminic priests. 
 
A Brief Overview of Ayurveda 
 
Ayurveda is the veda (knowledge) of ayus (life or longevity). As 
practiced in modern India, the tradition has changed substantially from its 
classical roots, incorporating elements of Islamic, western, and folk medicine 
(Leslie 1976; cf. Gangadharan 1990, Filliozat 1990). The Indian government, 
under the Bharatiya Janata Party, is currently promoting Ayurveda, with 
substantially budgetary support, as part of its program of encouraging 
swadeshi, indigenous systems (Kumar 2000). As now practiced in the West, 
Ayurveda incorporates many characteristics of individualistic self-help 
spiritualities (e.g., Tirtha 1998; Frawley 1999). Zysk refers to the latter 
development, which has occurred primarily in North America over the last 
decade and a half, as “New Age Ayurveda” (2001). In this paper, ‘Ayurveda’ 
refers solely to the classical medical tradition as set out in the ancient Sanskrit 
texts. 
The primary texts of classical Ayurveda are the Caraka Samhita and 
the Susruta Samhita.ii The earliest strata of both texts date most likely from 
just before the Common Era, though it seems likely that both works, if not 
compilations in their entirety, were at least substantially reworked as late as 
the ninth or tenth centuries (Wujastyk 2003, 3-4, 63-64; cf. Meulenbeld 1999, 
114, 130-141, 341-344; Zysk 1991, 33; Weiss 1980, 94, 103; Hoernle 1982 
[1909]). Caraka pays more explicit attention to theory. Susruta is primarily a 
surgical text, with its well-known and influential chapters on types and uses of 
surgical implements (Susruta, Su. 7-9). Both texts mention the importance of 
the Atharva-Veda to Ayurveda: for example, brahmins versed in that Veda are 
to be present at childbirth (Caraka, Sa. 8.34; cf. In. 12.80), and mantras from 
it are to be recited before all meals in order to detoxify food (Susruta, Su. 
46.141). 
Yet Ayurveda introduces a unique focus on the physical body and its 
processes, with an emphasis on observation and on the importance of 
grounded theoretical principles for successful therapeutics. On the one hand, 
we might expect a medical tradition from any culture to be relatively well 
grounded in observation and experience. On the other hand, according to 
those who see the tradition as scientific, the ayurvedic physicians developed 
something uniquely empirical and rational among ancient systems of thought: 
“Discarding scripture-orientation, they insist on the supreme importance of 
direct observation of natural phenomena and on the technique of rational 
processing of the empirical data . . .” (Chattopadhyaya 1977, 7). It is in this 
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attempt to go beyond describing therapeutics to explaining health and disease 
that Ayurveda stands out. 
Ayurvedic physicians are to seek the happiness of their patients, which 
involves primarily the prevention and cure of disease. However, wealth, 
happiness in the next life, and moksa (salvation) are frequently mentioned as 
secondary goals. Diseases are caused primarily by the inappropriate use of the 
mind and senses, though the immediate bodily manifestations of disease are 
explained in terms of material processes and entities. Proper use of mind and 
senses depends on the constitution of the individual, the time of the year, and 
ethical factors. Diseases are also caused by gods, demons, and patients’ 
actions in their past lives. Karma only partially determines an individual’s 
mental and physical constitution and causes disease only to a limited extent. 
As a result, healthy living and therapeutic actions can affect health in this life, 
despite karmic influences. 
 In treating disease, ayurvedic physicians seek to maintain the 
equilibrium of various physical components of the human body: the dhatus 
(tissue elements), rasa (chyle, plasma), blood, flesh, fat, bone, marrow, and 
semen. Magical cures, involving amulets and mantras, are recommended in 
certain cases, but the primary therapeutic focus is materialistic. The primary 
ayurvedic therapies are drugs, diet, emesis, purgation, and enemas. The 
common material basis of food and the body are central to all ayurvedic 
therapies. Food is ‘cooked’ in the body and reduced to a component that 
nourishes the seven tissue elements, each in turn, and a waste component that 
nourishes the impurities of the body, the malas. The malas include bodily 
emissions and, most importantly, the three dosas (humours): vata, pitta and 
kapha. So long as the dosas remain in proper balance for each individual, they 
present no problem. Disequilibrium of the three dosas, however, is the 
primary cause of disease and is the main focus of ayurvedic medical 
treatment. 
 
Ayurveda as Science 
 
Recent claims that Ayurveda was scientific are explicit that ‘science’ is 
to be taken here in terms of “the modern understanding of natural science” 
(Chattopadhyaya 1977, 2; cf. Zimmermann 1987, 212; Meulenbeld 1987, 4-5). 
This section considers several ways in which Ayurveda might appear, at first 
sight, to be scientific in this narrow sense: materialism, empirical observation, 
experimentation, falsification of theories, quantification, a developed 
conception of proof, and two specific logical concepts (prabhava and yukti). 
The purpose of this section is to measure Ayurveda by this modern western 
definition of science, in order to evaluate claims that it does, in fact, meet this 
definition. A close reading of the texts leads to the conclusion that Ayurveda 
was not properly scientific according to these criteria, though it was empirical, 
i.e., observation-based, in more general ways that would seem to apply to any 
medical tradition.  
Many aspects of Ayurveda are materialistic. A wide variety of medicinal 
substances are held to bring about the equilibrium of the components of the 
body. Observation of physical symptoms (e.g., pain, complexion, strength, 
appetite, sleep, digestion—Caraka Vi. 8.89) is central to correct diagnosis and 
treatment. In addition, the physical environment is held to play an important 
role in health, disease, and the efficacy of medicinal substances (e.g., Caraka 
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Vi. 3.7-8). The concept of time also reflects attentive observation of material 
phenomena (i.e., a broadly empirical stance). For example, time is an 
important factor in the constitution of the embryo (Caraka Vi. 8.95, Sa. 2.29). 
In addition, attentiveness to the seasons and to the temporal progression of 
diseases is a crucial factor in the administration of therapy (Caraka Su. 11.46, 
13.18-19, 25.45-47, 26.13, Vi. 8.125-128).  
Yet, Caraka is explicit that this materialistic dimension is only one 
approach to medical treatment: 
 
[Therapies] are of two types, viz. spiritual and rational. Spiritual 
therapy comprises incantation, talisman, jewels, auspicious rites, 
religious sacrifices, oblations, religious rites, vow, atonement, fasting, 
chanting of auspicious hymns, paying obeisance, pilgrimage, etc. 
Elimination as well as alleviation therapies and such other regimens, 
effects of which can be directly perceived, belong to the category of 
Rational Therapy. Depending upon the nature of their composition, 
they are also of two types, viz. those having material substrata [e.g., 
medicinal substances] and those without having any material substrata 
[e.g., massage, physical restraint, or frightening the patient]. (Caraka 
Vi. 8.87; cf. Su. 30.28) 
 
This sort of reference to religious therapies is exactly the sort of passage that is 
held to be a later imposition (or earlier survival) by those who argue that 
Ayurveda is scientific. Yet merely the presence of materialistic elements does 
not make Ayurveda scientific. 
 The above list of material phenomena to be observed underlines the 
centrality of empirical observation in Ayurveda. But, again this is not 
sufficient to make it science. For example, observation is used to draw non-
material conclusions: Caraka holds, for example, that an observable 
“twinkling of the eye” is evidence for the existence of the Absolute Soul (Sa. 
1.70). Caraka goes so far as to label as “heterodox” the view that sensory 
perception is the only path to valid knowledge, insisting on “other sources of 
knowledge, viz., scriptural testimony, inference and reasoning”; moreover, 
Caraka insists that “it is not correct to say that only things which can be 
directly perceived exist, and others do not” (Su. 11.8).iii  
Ayurveda’s emphasis on observation as a source of knowledge is not 
sufficient to support the claim that it was scientific. To be considered 
empirical in a scientific sense, a system of thought must do more than simply 
link knowledge claims to observable phenomena; it must do so in certain 
ways. To support the strong claim that Ayurveda was science, we would need 
to demonstrate that ayurvedic knowledge was arrived at or extended through 
processes of experimental verification or falsification. We would need to ask 
whether the medical concepts were accepted, modified or rejected on the basis 
of observation or experimentation. An empirical relation between data and 
practice is very different from one between data and theory.iv  
 There is no evidence of experimentation as a means of 
verifying/falsifying theories in classical Ayurveda. Zimmerman finds “No 
examination, no research, no enquiry or attempt to find a reason for the data . 
. .” (1987, 158). Of course, the texts do encourage certain sorts of observation. 
Students of Ayurveda are instructed to learn anatomy from “direct personal 
observation” of “all the various different organs, external and internal” of a 
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human corpse that has soaked in water for a week (Susruta, Sa. 5.50-56). 
Practical knowledge is also grounded in direct experience: students are to 
practice surgical techniques on gourds and dead animals (Susruta, Su. 9.1-3). 
More intriguingly, the texts give occasional instructions for empirical tests to 
determine the specific nature of substances:  
 
The test in the case of Gangam rain water consists on exposing to it, for 
[48 minutes], a quantity of undiscoloured Shali rice in a silver bowl. . . . 
Gangetic rain water should be ascertained from the fact of the aforesaid 
Shali rice not being in any way affected in its colour. . . . (Susruta, Su. 
45.3) 
 
Although such examples reinforce the claim that Ayurveda is empirical in a 
weak sense, they do not indicate a properly scientific relation between theory 
and data. 
 Quantification is often considered a key characteristic of scientific 
reasoning and method as manifested in ancient medical systems (Lloyd 1986, 
257). The classical Ayurvedic texts show some limited evidence of this, but not 
enough to qualify as properly scientific. The ayurvedic texts also attend closely 
to time, with an emphasis on astrological timing, and attentiveness to the 
seasons, the duration of alterations in diet during periods of therapy, and 
cycles of human life and reproductive processes. They specify appropriate 
dosages of medicinal substances. All these factors again underline the 
importance of observation. These examples, however, do not “go far beyond 
the range of what could be justified fairly straightforwardly by appeals to 
readily accessible evidence”; they do not even attempt the “spurious 
quantification and ad hoc numerological elaboration” that G.E.R. Lloyd finds 
in some Hippocratic texts (1986, 257). In other words, we find an instantiation 
of sankhya (enumeration), a notion important in Indian thought, and we find 
enumeration linked in a very general way with observation; but we do not find 
the connections between quantification, experimentation, and theory 
generation that are hallmarks of modern western science. Once again, claims 
that Ayurveda was, in fact, scientific in this narrow sense are not supported. 
A rigorous conception of proof is another criterion of science that is not 
clearly instantiated in the classical Ayurvedic texts. The path by which 
ayurvedic knowledge was generated and established is unclear. We can 
neither credit nor discount a claim that this knowledge was proven 
empirically. Despite claims to the contrary, Vedic ritual appears not to have 
manifested an explicit notion of proof (Lloyd 1990, 98-104). The ayurvedic 
texts emphasize authority and tradition, rather than proof and empirical 
evidence, as sources of legitimacy for medical knowledge (Caraka, Vi. 8.13-
14). 
Nor is there any appeal to any conception of proof in the rules for 
debate between physicians (Caraka, Vi. 8.15-28). Emphasis is placed almost 
exclusively on the personal qualities of participants. The text sets out 
normative standards for supporting substantive positions taken by 
practitioners within the discipline, and issues of proof do not receive even a 
superficial nod. Argument is rhetorical not empirical. This neglect of empirical 
evidence supports the view that Ayurveda’s empirical characteristics were 
neither logically nor practically fundamental in a manner analogous to 
modern science. It is not surprising that Ayurveda involved different criteria 
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for authority than does modern western science. However, this difference is 
one more counter-argument to claims that it was scientific in this narrow 
sense. 
 Two other arguments that Ayurveda was scientific point to its 
conceptual apparatus. First, a set of four concepts (rasa, vipaka, virya and 
prabhava) deals with pharmacological anomalies (Caraka, Su. 26.53-79; 
Sharma 1999, 184-187; cf. Susruta, Su. 40). That is, these concepts appear at 
first sight to represent theory modification in the light of empirical 
observation. Second, the concept of yukti represents a form of empirically 
based inference uniquely defined by Caraka (Su. 11.21-25; cf. Dasgupta 1932, 
376n1). A closer examination of these concepts will show that, although they 
are clearly empirical in a limited sense, they are not scientific as 
Chattopadhyaya (1977, 7, 9, 175-179, 207, 314ff., 390) and Larson (1987, 250-
51) suggest. 
Ayurveda has a well-developed set of logical concepts and categories, 
reflecting its emphasis on causal analysis. It explains the effects of medicinal 
substances in terms of putatively material substances and processes using an 
equilibrium model of health. Ayurvedic theory draws on philosophical 
concepts from other ancient schools of thought.v However, it displays several 
unique characteristics. The logical examples found in the Caraka are almost 
entirely of a medical nature, suggesting that they are integral to Ayurveda 
rather than grafted on (Dasgupta 1932, 402). In addition, Caraka mentions 
but does not use terms for ‘cause’ drawn from different traditions, indicating a 
reliance on its own tradition of causal analysis (Dasgupta 1932, 395). 
Medicinal substances are categorized at the most general level 
according to their rasa, taste (Caraka, Su. 26.53-79; cf. Susruta, Su. 40).vi 
Substances with specific combinations of rasa are held to act in specific ways 
upon the dosas. A physician infers a specific imbalance of the dosas from the 
patient’s constitution, symptoms, habitat, and the time of year. He then 
prescribes a specific diet or medicine that is chosen with regard to its rasa, so 
as to counteract the imbalance of the dosas. 
 The ayurvedic physicians recognized, however, that some substances 
did not have the effect they should have, given their rasa. That is, they 
recognized that their most basic concept of pharmacological categorization did 
not always reflect empirical facts. This seems a type of trial and error 
methodology but is not in itself scientific. Where the medicinal action of a 
substance did not agree with its rasa, the discrepancy was accounted for with 
the second-level concept of vipaka (post-digestive taste). That is, the action of 
the substance was still a result of ‘taste,’ but of a taste that resulted from 
changes to the substance in the human body. Caraka and Susruta disagree 
over the vipaka of certain substances, which suggests that the inference of a 
substance’s vipaka from its medicinal effects was somewhat problematic 
(Meulenbeld 1987, 10). The physicians recognized further that sometimes 
substances with the same rasa and the same vipaka still differed in their 
effects. This was accounted for with the third-level concept of virya (potency). 
In the case that two substances had the same rasa, vipaka and virya and still 
differed in their effects, this was accounted for with the fourth-level concept of 
prabhava (specific action).  
This repeated invocation of higher-level concepts to explain anomalies 
is ad hoc. In its broader sense, the fourth-level concept, prabhava refers to a 
power, generally seen as inaccessible to reason, which is manifested in the 
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effects of rasa, vipaka and virya. In its narrower sense, prabhava refers to a 
power, not accessible to reason, that a given substance has by virtue of its 
svabhava (nature) (Meulenbeld 1987, 14). Svabhava, inherent nature, is the 
reason that each substance has the qualities or properties that it has: each 
substance is what it is just because it is that way. Chattopadhyaya translates 
svabhava as “laws of nature” and argues that the concept demonstrates the 
scientific nature of Ayurveda (Chattopadhyaya 1977, 9, 175-179). This is 
misleading, given that svabhava is a quiddity beyond the reach of reason: the 
ultimate explanation for the behaviour of specific substances is that it is their 
nature to behave this way. Filliozat argues that Ayurveda is not empirical on 
these very grounds: this chain of concepts is “a dogmatism which interprets 
experience” not a theory responsible to empirical evidence (Filliozat 1964, 30).  
The series of concepts, rasa, vipaka, virya and prabhava show that 
ayurvedic theory recognized pharmacological anomalies but dealt with them, 
ultimately, by placing them beyond rational explanation. These concepts 
demonstrate a clear interplay between empirical observation and theory, but 
one that is stipulative not scientific. When the facts did not fit the theory, the 
theory was saved by appeal to a concept beyond empirical observation; it was 
not modified to more accurately reflect the facts. The fact that observations 
led ultimately not to theory modification but to an appeal to an irrational 
concept of nature collapses any analogy with modern science (cf. Meulenbeld 
1987, 4; Filliozat 1964, 29-30). 
  A separate argument for the scientific status of Ayurveda rests on the 
epistemological concept of yukti. According to Caraka, there are four means 
of attaining knowledge: reliable testimony, perception, inference, and yukti 
(Su. 11.21-25; Wujastyk 2003, 25; Sharma 1994, 72). Yukti, as a term for 
“reason,” has stood in tension with “authoritative tradition” at several points 
in the history of Indian thought (Halbfass 1988, 207, 278-79, 389, 536n16, 
541n94). However, as defined in Caraka, the concept is unique to Ayurveda: 
“when from a number of events, circumstances, or observations one comes to 
regard a particular judgement as probable, it is called yukti . . .” (Dasgupta 
1932, 376n1). Caraka says little regarding the definition or application of 
yukti. Yukti “perceives things as outcomes of [a] combination of multiple 
causative factors” (Su. 11.25). As examples, Caraka mentions forecasting a 
harvest from the condition of the seed, ground and weather, reasoning that 
fire will be produced when two pieces of wood are rubbed together with 
sufficient vigour, and predicting the efficacy of therapeutic measures based on 
specific symptoms. Chattopadhyaya argues that yukti, which he translates as 
“rational application,” indicates the scientific nature of Ayurveda (1977, 7, 
207, 314ff., 390). Gerald Larson echoes this claim when he translates yukti as 
“heuristic reasoning” and claims that “what the medical practitioners are 
trying to get at with their notion of yukti [is] an empirical and, indeed, 
experimental scientific (in the modern sense) approach to reality and 
experience” (1987, 250-51). 
Although yukti is another example of an impressive attentiveness to 
empirical observation, there are problems with the claim that the concept 
made Ayurveda scientific. First, the characterization of yukti is too sketchy 
and ambivalent to support such a claim. Second, the most important classical 
medical commentator, Cakrapani, (as well as the non-medical commentator 
Santaraksita) and the respected historian of Indian philosophy Surendranath 
Dasgupta, question the status of yukti as a separate means of attaining 
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knowledge: they argue that it is properly subsumed under the more general 
case of inference (Dasgupta 1932, 375). Caraka equates the two at a different 
point (Vi. 4.4). Third, even granted the value of such a conception of causal 
inference within an empirical medical tradition, there is no reason to see this 
as a properly scientific characteristic. The concept of yukti is another indicator 
of the medical tradition’s attentiveness to empirical data but not an indicator 
of a scientific relation between these data and medical theory. 
In sum, the strong claim that Ayurveda was scientific fails, though the 
centrality of empirical observation is obvious. Ayurveda simply does not 
manifest characteristics of modern science in anything more than a vague 
analogous sense. To say that ayurvedic physicians were “working scientists” 
who developed “the scientific method” (Chattopadhyaya 1986, 34) or that 
Ayurveda manifested an “experimental scientific (in the modern sense) 
approach to reality and experience” (Larson 1987, 251) is simply wrong. This 
is true whether we consider materialism, empiricism, quantification, 
experimentation, verification and falsification, or theory modification as 
characteristics of science and scientific method. The claim that Ayurveda was 
scientific reduces to the claim that it was broadly empirical. Let us turn now to 
the corollary that it was non-religious. 
 
Religion in Ayurveda 
 
Religious ideas are found throughout the ayurvedic texts. This section 
considers the place of four of these—the sacred cow, karma, religious views of 
the self, and magical cures—and concludes that Vedic elements are too central 
to be discounted as marginal but that brahminic elements are not so central. 
We find no categorical opposition between science and religion; rather we will 
need to look for a more nuanced tension between this empirical medical 
tradition and certain religious elements. That is, the claim that all religious 
elements are external to Ayurveda fails, but the possibility remains alive that 
the texts do reflect historical tensions between physicians and brahmins.  
The first dimension of religion in Ayurveda is the prominent place of 
cows in the texts. The issue here is the extent to which Ayurveda broke with 
Vedic tradition (where arguments that Ayurveda was truly scientific hold as a 
corollary that any Vedic, and brahminic, elements were marginal). The 
secondary literature reveals a spectrum of views, from continuity to 
discontinuity. Filliozat holds that “Ayurveda is the legitimate heir to the 
[Atharva] Veda, but it has developed to a large extent the patrimony thus 
received” (1964, 188).  Dasgupta notes parallels between the concepts of 
Ayurveda, especially those of the Caraka, and the Atharva-Veda, and he 
states, “it may not be unreasonable to suppose that the Atreya school, as 
represented by Caraka, developed from the Atharva-Veda” (Dasgupta 1932, 
279). He suggests that the Susruta Samhita might represent a tradition with a 
different provenance. Ultimately, though, Dasgupta emphasizes discontinuity 
between the Vedic and ayurvedic traditions, stressing the uniqueness of 
Caraka’s materialistic view of the causes of disease (1932, 301).  
Chattopadhyaya emphasizes discontinuity, arguing explicitly against Filliozat 
(Chattopadhyaya 1977, 251-269). For Zimmermann, Ayurveda parted ways 
with the Vedic tradition from which it emerged because it represents a 
“movement of thought toward . . . concrete and biogeographical realities. . . .” 
(1987, 216). Zysk explains the transition from Vedic to Ayurvedic medicine as 
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a Kuhnian paradigm shift, though he notes that the persistence of magico-
religious elements jars with such an emphasis on discontinuity (1991, 5, 117). 
However, as Zysk notes, evidence to support the independent development of 
ayurvedic theory is missing (1991, 119).  
However, the case of the cow casts important light on this issue. 
Ayurveda is ambiguous about the cow. Two views stand in obvious tension. 
On the one hand, cattle products (beef, milk, urine, and dung) are to be taken 
internally for medicinal purposes (cf. Chattopadhyaya 1977, 389).vii For 
example, after giving birth, women should consume a paste made, in part, 
from “a portion of the right ear of the untamed and alive bull … cut and 
smashed in a stone mortar” (Caraka, Sa. 8.41). On the other hand, the cow is 
to be treated with all the respect due from orthodox brahmins.viii How are we 
to interpret a text that holds that cows are to be both eaten and not harmed? 
The apparent contradiction is resolved if we accept that the religious 
elements are earlier survivals or later impositions (Chattopadhyaya 1977, 15, 
380-387; cf. Zimmermann 1987, 186). On this view, divine proscriptions and 
bovine prescriptions have no common ground. However, the contrast between 
religious/orthodox and empirical/medical references to cattle is not as sharp 
as this argument demands. This is not to deny that some passages may well be 
later brahminic additions. But the majority of passages discussing the 
therapeutic use of cows clearly echo Vedic tradition and in a manner that 
makes intrinsic sense within the conceptual framework of Ayurveda itself. 
Comparison with Vedic views suggests that reverence for the bovine was part 
of earlier tradition that Ayurveda developed but did not leave behind.ix 
 The Vedic idea that all food is ‘cooked’ in the body is axiomatic in 
classical Ayurveda. In the Vedas, the cow was a potent symbol of the ‘cooking 
of the world,’ the creative role that sacrifice had in shaping and maintaining 
the world and its processes (Zimmermann 1987, 207, 220). Ayurveda 
elaborates this cosmic cooking in order to characterize individuals and their 
relation to their physical environment (Zimmermann 1987, 207). For 
example, several themes important to both Vedic and ayurvedic texts converge 
in the relation between the cow and its milk. According to the Rig Veda, the 
cow manifests a fundamental ambiguity because it is raw (needing further 
preparation to be converted into food) yet it produces a cooked food, milk, 
which is ready to consume (Srinivasan 1979, 51, 119, 135). ‘Cow’ is used in the 
Vedas as a metaphor for ‘rays of light,’ ‘rays of dawn,’ and ‘dawn’ because of 
the animal’s bright and light-like milk (Srinivasan 1979, 45, 118). This 
connection between the cow and the sun extends to the sacrificial fire 
(Srinivasan 1979, 52, 120-121). Agni, the god of the sacrificial fire, is 
frequently referred to as a cow or a bull (Srinivasan 1979, 81, 142). In 
Ayurveda, cow’s milk is an elixir par excellence because it has the qualities of 
the vital fluid, ojas, the necessary essence of all bodily constituents (Caraka, 
Su. 27.218, 30.9-14; cf. Susruta, Su. 15.25-31; Narayanaswami 1990; Tilak 
1989, 76). The same term is found in the Atharva Veda, where Agni is ojas 
and is asked to give ojas to the worshipper (Dasgupta 1932, 293). Vedic 
sacrifice sustained the cosmic and social order, and ayurvedic therapies 
sustained the fluid equilibrium of the human body. 
The claim that ayurvedic passages valuing the cow are inauthentic is 
untenable, given that the Vedic metaphor of cooking is basic to the conceptual 
framework of Ayurveda. In this case, the alleged rift between science and 
religion in the ayurvedic texts threatens to throw out the baby with the 
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bathwater—or cooking with the cow. It is one thing to label certain passages as 
inauthentic; it is something else to call into question the guiding metaphor of 
the entire system of thought. There seems to be no reason to discount these 
passages except the assertion that they are non-empirical: the circularity is 
obvious. 
It might be argued that Ayurveda drew on but radically transformed 
Vedic ideas, using them either as technical terms for new empirical concepts 
or as new guiding metaphors to frame these (cf. Goonatilake 1992, 222). But 
this is a truism. The metaphor of cooking necessarily took on a different 
significance in the light of the physicians’ experience with the material process 
of the human body and the effects of diet, climate, and medicinal substances. 
This is really just to assert that Ayurveda drew on but went beyond its Vedic 
roots, that the two traditions are both continuous and discontinuous. To say 
that this ancient medical tradition was both somewhat empirical and reflected 
religious themes of its times is a far cry from showing it to have been science 
and not religion. It merely asserts Ayurveda to be what it obviously was, a 
post-Vedic North Indian medical tradition. It appears necessary to think of 
layers rather than of one static text, but the boundaries between these layers 
are not sharply defined. 
 A second dimension of religion in Ayurveda is the concept of karma. 
The ayurvedic view of karma is cited both as an example of religious ideas 
grafted onto rational ones and, contrarily, as an example of the extent to 
which Ayurveda is rational. Dasgupta argues that the ayurvedic view of karma 
was uniquely rational in its denial of determinism (Dasgupta 1932, 402-403; 
cf. Weiss 1980). Zysk agrees that it was an authentic element of the medical 
tradition (1991, 30). Chattopadyaya, on the other hand, argues that karma was 
a later imposition on the text by the “brahminic counter-ideology” (1977, 186-
189).  
Karma in Caraka explains both certain causes of disease and the 
formation of the fetus. In both cases, however, karma is only one factor among 
several. Susruta, in fact, does not mention karma in its section on the etiology 
of disease (Weiss 1980, 93). The ayurvedic view of karma is less deterministic 
than other South Asian views, allowing that actions in this life can override 
karmic influences from previous lives: “A weak daiva (actions during the 
previous life) get subdued by a strong purusakara (action during the present 
life). Similarly, a strong daiva subdues purusakara . . .” (Caraka, Vi. 3.33-
34).x This shifted emphasis from one’s behaviour in past lives to one’s 
behaviour in this life (Weiss 1980, 110). In addition, physical circumstances 
and medical therapies can override karmic influences. That is, the physical 
and mental constitution of the individual is not solely a result of karma: the 
constitutions and actions of the parents, time of year, and even the diet of the 
pregnant mother are held to be contributing factors. Both these dimensions of 
Ayurveda’s view of karma make room for the view that diet, medication and 
the proper use of mind and senses in this life can have an effect on health and 
disease. Hence, there seems to be no need to argue, as Chattopadhyaya would 
have it, that karma is a later religious imposition. 
 Although the ayurvedic concept of karma opens the door for an 
empirical therapeutics, the concept is used in a way that counts against the 
claim that Ayurveda was scientific. Karma is used to explain diseases that do 
not fit the pattern of an imbalance of the dosas and cases where the disease is 
resistant to treatment: “Notwithstanding this success of Ayurveda in 
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assimilating a karma doctrine, from an etic perspective it manifests an 
abandoning of empirical medical methodology in the face of insurmountable 
illness” (Weiss 1980, 109-110).xi Karma, like the concepts of prabhava and 
svabhava discussed above, is used in an ad hoc manner to explain anomalies. 
A third dimension of religion in Ayurveda consists of religious views of 
the self. xii Ayurvedic texts focus primarily on the constitution and ailments of 
the physical body: “The body constitutes the root cause of the well being of the 
individual. . . . Leaving everything else, one should maintain the body. For if 
there is no body, there is nothing that can be made available to the individual” 
(Caraka, Ni. 6.6-7). However, this material, embodied conception of the 
human self is not the only one found in the classical texts: the religious 
doctrines of karma and rebirth, moksa, and union with Brahman are present 
in the texts and offer alternative views. For example, Ayurveda is the science 
of ayus (‘life’ or ‘longevity’), but anubandha (that which transmigrates from 
one body to another) is a synonym for ayus (Caraka, Su. 1.41-42). Once again, 
discussion centres on whether these other views can be shown to be 
extraneous. 
The human object of medical knowledge and practice is discussed in 
terms taken largely from the Vaisesika and, to a lesser extent, the Samkhya 
philosophical schools (e.g., Caraka, Sa 1.17, 53). Mind, soul, and body 
together constitute Purusa, the subject matter of Ayurveda (Caraka, Su. 1.46-
47). Prakrti is the source of creation, and the other components of Purusa 
evolve from it under the influence of a disequilibrium of the three 
fundamental principles (gunas): sattva, rajas, and tamas (Caraka, Sa. 1.67-
69; cf. Samkhya-karika 25). Even here, in the most material and empirical 
discussion of the constitution of human beings in Caraka, we find a view that 
is not exclusively so.  
In addition to this philosophical view, not widely used in Caraka, the 
text has other less materialistic views. Three are especially relevant. First, 
Caraka’s section on embryology states that the combination of soul, mind and 
the five fundamental ‘subtle’ elements is that which transmigrates (Sa. 2.31; 
cf. 2.35-37, 3.1-3, 8, 18). Second, moksa (salvation or liberation from the 
karmic cycle) is repeatedly stated to be a goal of life in Caraka. Knowledge of 
one’s true nature as identical with all the universe is said to lead to union with 
Brahman, and ayurvedic knowledge is included as one of the paths to 
salvation (Caraka, Sa. 5.11-12, Su. 25.40; cf. 1:435). Third, the fetus is said to 
be a result of two factors: the union of father’s semen and mother’s blood, and 
the admixture of the atman (true self or universal mind) with the subtle body 
(the immaterial body that transmigrates). The latter is the means whereby the 
individual’s karma affects the fetus. Atman is the eternal sustainer of 
consciousness (Caraka, Su. 11.13); but it senses only when in contact with the 
sense organs, and it knows only through its constant association with mind 
(manas) (Caraka, Su. 1.46-47, Sa. 1.75-76, 3.18-19; cf. Dasgupta 1932, 310, 
369). 
Caraka describes human nature in conflicting ways: as embodied, as 
transmigrating, and as identical with the universe and Brahman. We must ask 
whether the non-materialistic views are inauthentic additions. These views 
reflect later brahminic rather than earlier Vedic religious beliefs. Simply 
noting this fact offers no support for the hypothesis of brahminic intervention 
in the medical texts. After all, Caraka is explicit that different views of human 
nature are relevant in different contexts, with the material view most 
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important for medicine (Sa. 1.132). The possibility remains, however, that 
these distinct views of the human person reflect a tension between the 
ayurvedic physicians and brahminic orthodoxy. 
A fourth dimension of religion in Ayurveda is the other Other of 
science: magic. The Ayurvedic texts abound with diagnostic and therapeutic 
claims that seem superstitious or magical. Caraka, for example, in addition to 
its frequent emphasis an empirical observation and materialistic explanation, 
contains many such passages: to cite just a few, astrological timing is vital 
throughout (e.g., Ni. 7.14; cf. Susruta Sa. 10.41, Ci. 13.8); clouds that obscure 
the moon or confused birds indicate an unhealthy region (Vi. 3.7-8); dreams 
and omens are important signs (e.g., Ni. 7.6, In. 1.3); wearing appropriate 
jewels is curative (e.g., Ni. 7.16; cf. Susruta Ci. 24.40); ethical actions such as 
paying respect to crossroads and not stepping on the shadows of kin results in 
health (Su. 8.18-19); a small statue of a man will help change the sex of a fetus 
to male (Sa. 8.19; cf. Susruta Sa. 3.15, 10.2). Susruta tells us that the use of a 
certain oil can allow one to live a thousand years (Ci. 6.17; cf. 28.6), that 
wearing shoes protects one from evil spirits (Ci. 24.47-48), and that the 
sounds of drums treated with a certain substance “destroy the effects of even 
the most dreadful poison” (Ka. 3.12). There is no obvious contradiction in 
claiming that Ayurveda was part empirical and part magical. That is, the 
presence of these passages are consistent with the claim that Ayurveda was 
largely empirical in a weak sense, but not with arguments that it was scientific.  
The texts themselves seems at times explicitly to acknowledge the value 
of different approaches that, at first sight, seem as scientific, magical, and 
religious (or as properly Ayurvedic, Vedic, and braminic) (Chattopadhyaya 
1977, 18, 367). Caraka holds that the views of different traditions—e.g., 
medical, ritualistic (Vedic), and spiritual (brahminic)—are appropriate in 
different circumstances (Vi. 8.54; cf. Su. 25.26-29). It also distinguishes three 
types of therapy: therapy based on reasoning (“administration of proper diet 
and medicinal drugs”); spiritual therapy (using mantras, charms, and gems); 
and psychic therapy (emphasizing “withdrawal of mind from harmful 
objects”) (Su. 11.55; Wujastyk 2003, 33). 
Given the complex intermingling of empirical and magical passages 
and the texts’ explicit acceptance of these tensions, the view that Ayurveda 
was scientific in a modern sense begs some problematic footwork. One 
approach would be to assimilate these passages with Vedic tradition, to say 
that ‘magical’ and ‘Vedic’ are equivalent (cf. Zysk 1991, 118). The Vedas, above 
all the Atharva Veda, contain many similar passages. There are two problems 
with this: it adds to the difficulty of excising these passages as inauthentic by 
revealing a more pervasive and complex relation to Vedic tradition; and the 
variety of ‘magical’ elements transcends Vedic models. For example, even in 
passages where the “rational” nature of the ayurvedic texts is emphasized 
exclusively, a look at the source text often indicates a striking admixture of 
magical elements whose origin is not obviously the Vedas (e.g., Caraka, Su. 
8.18-29; cf. Dasgupta 1932, 420-421; Chattopadhyaya 1977, 144-145). Another 
approach would be to suggest that the texts reflected contemporary popular 
beliefs at these points, rather than the Vedas themselves: the later history of 
Ayurveda demonstrates the inclusion of such elements (Leslie 1976). 
However, any attempt to discard ‘non-science’ from the texts would leave us 
with even more complex strata of non-empirical elements to explain away, yet 
with insufficient evidence to do so. 
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A third option would be to argue that many of the magical elements 
were a best guess empiricism appropriate to the times, formally empirical but 
substantively inaccurate (cf. Chattopadhyaya 1977, 158, 172-173). For example, 
Caraka tells us that  
 
Ayurveda has eight branches, viz., 1. Internal medicine, 2. Science of 
diseases specific to supra-clavicular region, viz. eye, ear, nose, mouth, 
throat, etc., 3. Surgery, 4. Toxicology, 5. Science of demonic seizures 
(Psychology), 6. Pediatrics, 7. Science of rejuvenation and 8. Science of 
aphrodisiacs. (Su. 30.28) 
 
Is the “science of demonic seizures” to be taken as science, religion, or magic? 
Given that modern psychology has lagged behind the physical sciences, we 
might give the benefit of the doubt to ancient physicians labouring to explain 
the human mind in empirical terms. Ayurvedic discussions of insanity reflect 
a curious mixture of empirical aspects— symptoms of insanity caused by an 
imbalance of the doshas or by traumatic events include noises in the ears, 
spasms, incoherent speech, inappropriate anxiety or outbursts, loss of 
appetite, and continual anguish—and ‘magical’ or ‘religious’ aspects—certain 
dreams, “riding undesirable vehicles,” and the desire to injure cows or 
brahmins are all symptoms of insanity caused by demons, by going to a 
crossroads alone, by improper scriptural recitation or interpretation, by 
visiting a sacred tree or temple in an unclean state, or by the influence of 
inauspicious planets (Caraka, Ni. 7.7-14). Arguing that magic and religion fill 
in the gaps where empirical science has not yet reached would be one 
approach to maintaining, in principle at least, the line between scientific and 
‘magico-religious’ elements of the texts. After all, the former are more 
prominent in discussions of “endogenous” insanity and the latter of 
“exogenous.”  
However, there are three problems with the attempt to excise ‘magical’ 
elements by considering them a sort of proto-empiricism. It addresses only a 
small subset of such elements. It is circular by virtue of too rigid a view of 
science, taking parts of the text at face value when it suits the argument and 
discounting others. And, most importantly, it takes for granted that the 
concepts of science, religion, and magic can be used uncritically in historical 
and cross-cultural contexts. If we press the ayurvedic texts through a 
conceptual colander designed to filter out the non-empirical, we can conclude 
nothing apart from the fact that this medical tradition, like most, if not all, 
others, contains some empirical elements. 
In sum, the argument that Ayurveda was non-religious fails, as did the 
argument that it was scientific. The Vedic metaphor of cooking is too central 
to exclude. Other magical and religious elements are too prominent and 
explicitly acknowledged simply to explain them away, barring support from a 
thorough redaction analysis. However, certain elements (e.g., Upanishadic 
conceptions of the self) are not as central. Here the argument that the texts 
reflect later brahminic impositions seems at least tenable. Yet the argument 
that all religious and magical elements are extraneous to Ayurveda proper 
fails. The line between science and religion simply cannot be drawn through 
these ancient medical texts as Chattopadhyaya, Zimmermann, Zysk and 
others suggest. If there is a tension between elements of the text, this is not a 
categorical opposition between science and religion, but between the general 
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empirical bent and a very specific subset of religious passages. This leads us to 
ask why so much effort has been expended to apply the inappropriately 
general categories of science and religion to these texts. Perhaps there is 
something more here than a simple misapplication of modern western 
categories. 
 
Ideological Roles of ‘Science’ 
 
The general import of the arguments we have considered is that 
Ayurveda (1) was historically rooted to some extent in the ‘magico-religious’ 
Vedic tradition, (2) developed independently as an ‘empirico-rational’ 
tradition, and (3) was later assimilated by the ‘orthodox’ brahminic tradition. 
The trajectory is a plateau, up from religion to shine briefly as a beacon of 
proto-scientific empiricism, then down to religion again. An implicit valuation 
of science over religion haunts this debate. If ‘scientific’ Ayurveda supposedly 
stands out from its ‘religious’ background, we should question not just the 
positive evaluation of the former but also the negative evaluation of the latter.  
In 1613 Jesuit missionary Roberto Nobili included “Aiur vedam” in his 
list of the sciences of the brahmins, and he drew an implicitly ideological line 
through each of the various “scientiis quas Brahmanes tractant.” (At this time, 
of course, ‘science’ was a general term for a system of thought.) On the one 
hand, Nobili sifted his sources for what he considered to be religion, and he 
found in the concept of Brahman a reference to the “one, true, immaterial 
God, at least as far as it was possible for him to be known through the natural 
light of reason” (Halbfass 1988, 40). On the other hand, Nobili considered the 
majority of brahminic teachings, which did not echo his Christian conception 
of religion, to be “primarily secular, natural wisdom; the role of the Brahmins 
and their function, as well as their customs and insignia, were mundane and 
social in nature, not religious; they were ‘wise men,’ not idolators or temple 
priests” (Halbfass 1988, 41). The seventeenth-century Jesuit missionary had a 
vested interest in finding ‘religion’ at the heart of Hindu ‘science.’  
Is it possible that twentieth-century quests for ‘science’ in Ayurveda 
reflect a symmetrical concern to find reflections of another dominant Western 
worldview at the heart of Hinduism? These questions lead us to consider the 
possibility that attempts to pan scientific gold from religious silt in the 
ayurvedic texts reflect orientalist assumptions.xiii  
Three important points emerge here. First, academic writings on India 
and Hinduism have taken shape in a space of contact between South Asia and 
the West, in which space the West has had greater power, political and 
economic, throughout most if not all of the last century and a half when the 
majority of such academic writings were produced. Second, the concepts of 
religion and science—along with related terms such as Hinduism and 
rationality—have been interpreted and defined in a variety of ways in these 
discourses, and these struggles over the basic terms of debate cannot in good 
conscience be separated from struggles for economic and political power (cf. 
Benavides 2001).xiv Third, all sides of these debates are complex, with a 
spectrum of representations of self and other and with frequent active 
appropriations of concepts from the other side. 
A number of scholars have drawn attention in recent decades to a 
“tendency to read Indian history in terms of a lack, an absence, or an 
incompleteness that translates into ‘inadequacy’” (Chakrabarty 1992, 5). And 
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science is often that which India, or Hinduism, is said to lack: “The Indian 
mind is . . . [seen as] devoid of ‘higher’, that is, scientific rationality” (Inden 
1990, 264). Science has played a key role, for example, in (primarily Western) 
attempts to explain why the West has been progressive and dynamic in 
contrast to the conservative, static nature of Indian cultures: “People, in this 
view, take an active role in shaping their society only insofar as they or, more 
exactly, their leaders, have scientific knowledge of the physical and biological 
world and its analogue, the social world” (Inden 1986, 415). 
Indian scholars also drew on this valorization of science. Science came 
to be sharply opposed to traditional religious, social, and cosmological ideas in 
North India in the latter half of the nineteenth century (Baber 1996, 197; cf. 
Sangwan 1988, 217). The association between science and power was clearly 
recognized by the emerging western-educated urban elites: the bhadralok of 
Bengal, for example, “sought education in English and Western science in 
order to legitimize and consolidate their status in colonial society” (Baber 
1996, 235-236; cf. Raj 1991). Science was not simply imposed by colonial 
authorities on the indigenous population of India. Different groups of Indians, 
both Hindu and Muslim, of different social and regional backgrounds, 
appropriated the discourse and practice of science to a variety of ends 
(Sangwan 1988).   
On the one hand, science was reshaped in the light of religion: 
theoretical science was privileged over experimental work. The Brahmin 
elites—whose traditional status was due to their mastery of ‘clean’ knowledge, 
above all the Vedas—sought to regain status through appropriating the new 
Western knowledge of science within their traditional paradigm of expertise: 
“For them science was experimental only in theory. . . . It is thus with the old 
image of knowledge qua clean knowledge that the Bhadralok sought those 
aspects of Western science that would best correspond to it” (Raj 1991, 123).  
On the other hand, religion was reinterpreted in the light of science: 
 
Impressed and stimulated by scientific and industrial progress in the 
West, the [Western-educated Bangali] élite began to scrutinize 
indigenous religions and society in the light of scientific reason, not just 
rationality. Cultural traditions and social identities were realigned as 
the élite, infused and licensed by the sign of science, put science’s 
authority to work as a grammar of transformation to achieve the 
rearrangement of knowledges and subjects. (Prakash 1996, 60) 
 
Hinduism was reshaped in the nineteenth century: a convergence of science 
and religion produced an almost positivistic monotheism, a belief in the 
underlying oneness of all phenomena, with a new conception of Vedic 
tradition as based on the laws of nature (Prakash 1996, 72-73).xv  
Attempts to prove that Ayurveda was properly scientific, and that 
religious elements are inauthentic, resonate in three ways with these 
discussions of science and religion in discourses on and in India. First, they 
assert a sharp distinction between science and religion. The quest for science 
in post-Vedic India presupposes its absence elsewhere, as if, in Ayurveda, we 
find the exception that proves the rule. This detracts from other aspects of 
ancient Indian culture: for example, the rationality of the logicians, the 
materialism of the Ajivikas, the empiricism of the Carvakas, and the empirical 
observations of the astronomers (cf. Wolpert 1989, 86; Dasgupta 1987; 
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Brockington 1981, 74ff.; Seal 1982 [1915]; Prakash 1996, 63ff.; 
Chattopadhyaya 1982; contrast Chattopadhyaya 1977, 3-4). Second, these 
arguments seem to presuppose the superiority of modern western science in 
the attempt to excavate something ‘rational’ from ancient Indian traditions.xvi 
Third, the conception of science appealed to is too narrowly positivistic, 
ignoring complex struggles over interpretation and definition. 
These considerations lead us to stand back and take a closer look at the 
implications of using the categories of science, religion, and magic to make 
sense of these texts in the first place. One the one hand, we might take these 
terms as somehow natural, allowing us to use them to compare phenomena 
across time and space. On this view, science is science, religion is religion, and 
magic is magic in all cultures at all times. A common variant on this view is to 
take the modern hard sciences and Christianity as normative for ‘science’ and 
‘religion’ and to look for analogous features in other historical periods and 
cultures. On the other hand, we might emphasize varying interpretations or 
constructions of these terms, by different cultures or scholars. At the relativist 
extreme of the latter view, categories vary so much from context to context 
that no possibility of trustworthy comparison remains. The first alternative 
seems too naïve and the second too sceptical to justify any attempt to engage 
in research or discussion under their banner. 
  There is another possibility, “wherein concepts and categories emerge 
as creatures of history and necessity” (Benavides 1997, 303). On this view, 
religion and magic and the distinction between their respective realms vary 
across history and cultures according to comparable and investigable 
processes. The categories are constructed, but similarities in the construction 
process allow us to pursue comparative studies. Benavides discusses ‘magic’ 
and ‘religion,’ but the emergence of science in the modern West cannot be 
distinguished from similar historical processes. For Weber, a key measure of 
historical processes of rationalization in western and non-western cultures 
was the disenchantment of the world, the degree of systematic organization of 
a worldview and the extent to which it eradicated magical thought (Weber 
1958b, 293; 1951, 226; cf. Habermas 1981, 205; Bird 1984). For Benavides, 
more specifically,  
 
the emergence of categories involving the distinction between a realm 
identifiable purely as religious and one involving practices upon the 
physical world is an ever recurring historical phenomenon, having to 
do with processes that involve the centralization of power, the 
restriction of access to goods and the stigmatization of manual work. 
(1997, 305) 
 
In other words, conceptual tensions between  ‘religion,’ magic,’ and ‘science’ 
often reflect social, political and economic tensions. Insofar as each of these 
terms can carry connotations of legitimacy or illegitimacy, they can play a role 
in processes of exclusion. 
The hypothesis that historical shifts in the balance between concepts of 
religion, magic, and science reflect social, economic, and political changes is a 
productive one. More specifically, “the activities of the reformer and the 
skeptic become possible in interstitial situations”; the invention, ‘discovery,’ 
or transformation of these concepts “can be seen as the necessary result of the 
dislocations produced by economic and political changes” (Benavides 1997, 
 18 
321; cf. Bourdieu 1991). This is not a zero-sum game, where an increase in the 
perceived legitimacy of one of these three terms is necessarily offset by the 
decrease of another’s. A specific approach recommends itself. In order to 
make sense of dramatic shifts in historical relations between ‘religion,’ magic,’ 
and ‘science,’ we can look for correlated social, economic and political 
changes. 
 This approach to historical conceptions of ‘magic’ and ‘religion’ has 
obvious relevance for the case of classical Ayurveda. The arguments we have 
considered all posit just such a dramatic shift: an abortive legitimization of 
science over against competing ‘magico-religious’ traditions. We are led to 
examine the context within which Ayurveda took shape, to see if the alleged 
divergence of ‘science’ from ‘religion’ reflected social or other tensions at the 
time. 
 
Physicians and Brahmins 
 
Classical Ayurveda took shape during a period when the social, 
economic, political, and religious landscape of North India was going through 
dramatic changes. The texts were written (at least initially) during the period 
of political fragmentation, increasing trade, and cultural enrichment between 
the fall of the Maurya and the rise of the Gupta Empires (Wolpert 1989, 86). 
The religious landscape was rich: Vedic traditionalism, the elaboration of the 
Upanishads, the beginnings of devotional movements, the doctrine of karma 
yoga, and the codification of the major schools of philosophy gave ‘Hinduism’ 
a varied texture. Jainism, Buddhism, and a variety of unorthodox traditions 
also flourished in the same time and space.  Hence, it is misleading to posit a 
uniform post-Vedic culture as the “counter-ideology” that Ayurveda competed 
against (e.g., Chattopadhyaya 1977). This section considers the admittedly 
hypothetical possibility that tensions in the ayurvedic texts are best explained 
by social and economic competition between physicians and brahmins, not by 
conceptual tensions between the modern western categories of ‘science’ and 
‘religion.’ 
‘Religion,’ and by extension ‘magic’ and ‘science,’ delimit conceptual 
spheres that encompass contact between cultures as well as tensions within a 
given culture (Benavides 2001). For example, the eleventh-century Islamic 
scholar al-Biruni, discussing alchemy in the “Hind,” distinguished between 
magic and science: “We understand by witchcraft, making by some kind of 
delusion a thing appear to the senses as something different from what it is in 
reality. . . . Therefore witchcraft in this sense has nothing whatever to do with 
science” (1982, 329). Among the examples of Hindu magic that he discussed, 
al-Biruni included “charms . . . intended for those who have been bitten by 
serpents” (1982, 335). As noted above, exactly this sort of cure is found in the 
ayurvedic texts as well as the Atharva Veda (Susruta Ka. 5.2-5; cf. 
Chattopadhyaya 1977, 6). Where the magical aspects of Ayurveda called into 
question its legitimacy from a later Muslim perspective, its empirical aspects 
appear to have placed it in tension with one specific stream of its 
contemporary religious context, the new orthodox, post-Vedic Brahmanism. 
Throughout this paper, our attention has been turning from a general 
tension between science and religion to a specific tension between physicians 
and brahmins. The likelihood that Caraka has at least been reworked 
extensively, if it is not a compilation in its entirety, underlines the possibility 
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that certain passages were later additions. Several passages are clearly in the 
interest of the upper caste: “Devotion to the gods and Bráhmanas [brahmins] . 
. . add to one’s good name, piety, wealth, progeny and duration of life” 
(Susruta, Ci. 24.43); “desire for inflicting injury upon the gods, cows, 
brahmins and ascetics” is a sign of insanity caused by the gods (Caraka, Ni. 
7.11). It is arguable, in addition, that explicit references to moksa as the goal of 
life and Brahman as the true self are later impositions.  
 Some authors argue that the two primary ayurvedic texts manifest 
different degrees of brahminic influence. Filliozat argues that “the extremely 
brahminic contents of the Caraka-samhita . . . evokes the idea that its editor 
was . . . a Brahmin of a Vedic school” (1964, 21). N.H. Keswani argues that 
“Susruta has tried to cast off whatever shackles of priestly domination 
remained at his time, and created an atmosphere of independent thinking and 
investigation” (cited in Chattopadhyaya 1977, 35). However, this distinction is 
not persuasive. Both texts manifest significant brahminic elements, and the 
prevalence of a greater number of such passages in Caraka is easily explained 
by its more theoretical nature, in contrast to Susruta’s surgical emphasis (cf. 
Chattopadhyaya 1977, 36). It is hard to credit Susruta with freedom from the 
“shackles of priestly domination” when confronted by a passage such as the 
following: 
 
The god Brahma disclosed to the world the Atharva Veda together with 
the eight allied branches of Vedic literature and the science of 
medicine. And since a priest (Brahmana) is well-versed in the aforesaid 
branches of study, a physician should act subserviently and occupy a 
subordinate position to the priest. (Susruta, Su. 34.5)xvii 
 
A hypothetical social argument for the scientific nature of Ayurveda 
might assert that it manifested one of the key characteristics of modern 
science, engineering and medicine, namely professionalization. Caraka 
demonstrates three signs of rudimentary professionalization among 
physicians: an emphasis on correct training; explicit standards of conduct; 
and a sharp distinction between true physicians and quacks. The classical 
ayurvedic texts are clear that physicians are to be trained in certain specific 
ways, and to always carry out their practices in accordance with the principles 
of medicine: an excellent physician is one who has excellence in medical 
knowledge, extensive practical experience, and purity (Caraka, Su. 9.6, 1.120-
133). Following these principles, an intelligent physician can go beyond the 
text to find appropriate cures not given there (Caraka, Su. 4.20). False 
physicians and fakes are distinguished from genuine physicians (Caraka, Su. 
11.50-53; Wujastyk 2003, 33). One section of Caraka lists the characteristics 
of acceptable medical texts, teachers, students, and methods of study: suitable 
medical texts are acknowledged by “reputed experts,” “free from 
contradiction,” equipped with definitions and illustration”; suitable preceptors 
are those “equipped with practical knowledge,” “pious,” and whose 
“knowledge is not overshadowed (by the knowledge of other scriptures)”; and 
daily study should being with “prayers to the gods, sages, cows, brahmanas, 
teachers, elderly and enlightened person and preceptors” and proceed to 
memorization of the text (Vi. 8.3-7). Once again, the same section of the text 
contains elements that can be read as ‘scientific’ and as ‘religious.’ An 
extensive list of professional standards of conduct is to be delivered to the 
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students “in front of the fire, brahmanas and physicians” (Caraka, Vi. 8.13). 
Most significantly, the text enjoins respect for ayurvedic, religious and 
political authorities. 
A second social argument for the scientific status of Ayurveda claims 
that the necessary conditions for its becoming an empirico-rational tradition 
were met when physicians cohered in the face of social marginalization. This 
argument seeks to bolster the claim that Ayurveda was scientific by 
demonstrating that ayurvedic physicians constituted a distinct social group 
marginalized in the face of an emerging brahminic orthodoxy. If it can be 
shown that the physicians were in tension with the dominant religious group, 
this adds plausibility to the claim that passages reflecting brahminic views and 
interests are inauthentic. This would be extremely persuasive support for the 
view that Ayurveda’s scientific nature was cause and context of social tension 
with brahmins.  
Zysk, for example, argues that physicians “existed outside the 
mainstream” of post-Vedic society, developing empirical techniques and 
knowledge through exclusive mutual interaction (1991, 24).xviii The Dharma-
shastras (collections of legal and social ordinances that emerged during the 
period of Ayurveda’s formation, before the writing of the classical texts) have 
numerous passages that disparage doctors, linking them to unclean social 
groups (Chattopadhyaya 1977, 212ff.). Manu, for example, states that “Doctors 
… and people who support themselves by trade are to be excluded from 
offerings to the gods and ancestors” (Laws of Manu 3:152; cf. 3: 180; 4: 212, 
220). 
Susruta’s instructions on learning human anatomy by dissecting 
human corpses are cited both as evidence that Ayurveda was scientific and as 
a factor in the marginalization of ayurvedic physicians (Susruta, Sa. 5.50-56; 
Zysk 1991, 37; Chattopadhyaya 1977, 94-100; cf. Seal 1982 [1915], 37). Contact 
with corpses would have been considered extremely polluting, whatever its 
empirical advantages. The decision to pursue anatomical knowledge in this 
fashion could well have been a factor in the social marginalization of 
physicians. 
However, this argument assumes that actual practices reflected textual 
injunctions. Basham holds that dissection was extremely rare until well into 
the nineteenth century, citing concerns with pollution and a general lack of 
the very practical knowledge that supposedly rendered Ayurveda scientific: 
“The complete ignorance and uncertainty of even the best-educated Indians of 
earlier times about the nature and functions of the various organs of the body 
is hard to realize nowadays” (1976, 29; contrast Sangwan 1988, 215). The 
classical texts’ statements that dissection should be carried out do not 
necessarily imply that it was; we cannot discount the possibility that ayurvedic 
physicians acted differently than the texts suggest (Obeyesekere 1991, 422). It 
is hard to reconcile textual injunctions to learn by dissection with major gaps 
in anatomical knowledge presented in the texts: the heart was held to be the 
seat of consciousness, and the lungs were not mentioned (Zimmer 1948, 161-
169); even Susruta, with its elaborate surgical knowledge, fails to mention the 
brain, spinal cord, or pancreas (Sa. 5; cf. Bhishagratna 1991, iii). With regards 
to the skeleton, however, both Caraka and Susruta are very accurate. This 
might suggest that ayurvedic physicians respected the taboo against touching 
corpses but made observations of skeletons (Zimmer 1948, 175-177, cf. 
Basham 1976, 27-29). It is not clear that dissection was practiced to the extent 
 21 
necessary to cause the alleged marginalization of physicians, a marginalization 
held to be a social precondition of their development of a ‘science’ of medicine. 
xix 
Nor is it clear that the social status of physicians in post-Vedic society 
was low or marginal. Caraka clearly places medical studies within the 
traditional caste system, citing its value for each of the three highest castes: 
“Ayurveda is to be studied by brahmanas for providing benefit to all 
creatures, by ksatriyas for protection and by vaisyas for earning livelihood” 
(Caraka, Su. 30.29). Susruta ranks the king’s physician almost on a par with 
his priest (Susruta, Ka. 1.5, cf. Basham 1976, 32). Some ayurvedic physicians 
had powerful clients (Jaggi 1973, 74). In general, ambivalence of social status 
appears to have been the case down to recent times, with physicians subject to 
both respect and denigration depending on circumstances (Basham 1976, 32-
39). The argument that marginalization of ayurvedic physicians provided the 
conditions for their developing into “working scientists” is not supported 
(Chattopadhyaya 1986, 30; cf. 1977). 
To sum up, the texts show clear evidence of rudimentary 
professionalization among ayurvedic physicians. However, this is not enough 
to establish the degree of isolation from their social context that would 
support Zysk’s claim that they developed scientific methods through exclusion 
and marginalization. On the contrary, many elements of this 
professionalization bear directly on the nature of relations between the 
physicians and other members of their society.  
The denigration of physicians in the Dharma-shastras supports the 
view that tensions existed between brahmins and physicians. This was likely 
due in large part to the impurity of physicians’ contact with those outside the 
brahminical fold. I will end by considering another possible bone of 
contention between physician and priest, the obvious one of compensation for 
services rendered. 
The brahmins were not securely ensconced in a divinely ordained and 
stable monopoly of religious goods. The emergence of “the Ideal Brahman” 
has been a central factor in the historical emergence of “Hinduism” as an 
object of academic study: but the resulting picture of a static social and 
religious order, with priestly brahmins holding supreme rank in a rigid caste 
society originally ordained by the Vedas, does not reflect the historical facts 
(van der Veer, 1989). The key factor in this valuation of the brahmins (both in 
the ‘religious’ texts written by the brahmins themselves and in the ‘orientalist’ 
texts written by western scholars, both of which have had significant 
normative impact) has been the reification of a certain economic ideology. At 
the time Ayurveda was developing, the brahmins were not a powerful 
entrenched monopoly, but they were well positioned to corner a large slice of a 
growing market of religious goods. 
 The key concept in the religious economy of Brahminism was dana. 
Etymologically, ‘dana’ is derived from the verb ‘to give,’ and it refers to “the 
act of giving, bestowing, granting, yielding and prestation, irrespective of what 
is being given and when” (Thapar 1976, 37).  Dana was, and is, the payment 
due for ritual services rendered. In the Vedic period, it was closely linked to 
ritual sacrifice financed by wealthy patrons (Thapar 1976, 39; cf. Kane 1975, 
2:837ff.; Gonda 1965, 212).  In the period we are interested in, kings and other 
royalty became the most visible donors, because of their wealth and the status 
they gained by granting and protecting endowments made to brahmins and 
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religious institutions (Talbot 1988, 2ff.).  This most visible of the gifting 
relations that supported the brahmins misses the level at which we might 
expect to find competition between physicians and priests.  
 Three shifts in the nature of dana bring this potential for competition 
between physicians and brahmins to the fore. First, in the late Vedic period, 
dana shifted from “a channel of redistribution of wealth” to “a channel of 
deliberate exchange” (Thapar 1976, 42).  Second, a reciprocity between dana 
and merit arose in the classical period, perhaps influenced by the spread of 
Buddhism: giving to appropriate recipients, defined in terms of moral worth 
and caste, came to be seen as resulting in merit for the donor (Thapar 1976; cf. 
Kane 1975, 2:115). Brahmins were the most worthy recipients, but only if they 
are morally upright and well educated in the Vedas (Kane 1975, 5:937-938; cf. 
2:116, 746, 845-6; Gonda 1965, 226).  Third, dana was increasingly set forth 
as a worthy form of behaviour for householders. This was explicitly enjoined 
in the Dharma-shastras, where dana is held to be the special duty of 
householders (Kane 1975, 2:837; cf. Gonda 1965, 216). The same texts that 
told householders to give to brahmins told brahmins to accept nothing from 
physicians (Chattopadhyaya 1977, 213). 
The brahmins were broadening their market of ritual services during 
precisely the period when ayurvedic physicians were seeking to support 
themselves by offering medical treatments. This overview of the religious 
economy highlights the distinction between the two streams of ‘religion’ that 
are present in the ayurvedic texts. The Vedic tradition provided the central 
metaphorical framing for Ayurveda, but this conceptual relation had little 
practical bearing on the livelihood of the physicians. The orthodox brahminic 
tradition, on the other hand, was changing in a manner that brought its 
experts in great economic and social competition with the physicians. 
 Physicians and brahmins were competitors. On the one hand, there was 
overlap in terms of relevant expertise. The degree of this overlap depends, to 
some degree, on the degree to which Vedic (‘magical’) cures were part of the 
ayurvedic toolkit. In addition to the above arguments that Vedic elements 
cannot all be excised, the fact remains that ‘magical’ diagnoses and cures are 
prominent through the ayurvedic texts, for example in Susruta’s otherwise 
admirably empirical section on toxicology (Ka.). And these passages are 
clearly distinguishable from those expressing brahminic views.  
On the other hand, competition in a more profound sense may have 
emerged from the fact that Ayurveda shifted emphasis from an other-worldly 
to a this-worldly economy of human goods in a more profound sense than the 
Dharma-shastras’ emphasis on the aesthetic and material spheres of kama 
and artha. This is illustrated by the space that the ayurvedic concept of karma 
carved out for this-worldly causal explanations. Aside from competition for 
the opportunity to exercise their respective in specific cases, Ayurveda 
proposed a competing theodicy, a possibility of this-worldly salvation based in 
part in empirical observation and experience. This can hardly have escaped 
the notice of the brahmins who were actively working to corner the market in 
salvation.  
  In the light of strictures and scriptures that set out the brahmins’ place 
in a developing religious economy, we must turn to the ayurvedic texts in 
order to compare the economic placement of the physicians. Here we 
encounter a curious, though enlightening, silence. The classical ayurvedic 
texts say nothing of fees, not a word regarding remuneration or gifts (cf. Jaggi 
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1973, 74). We would expect to find some discussion of the economic 
integration of physicians whether their profession was entirely independent of 
or in sharp conflict with the brahmins. The absence of any account of a 
competing sphere of circulation of goods lends indirect support to the claim 
that the texts were edited by parties sympathetic to the brahmins, edited in a 
manner that minimized any reference to competition with the religious 
economy of the priests. One rare passage that hints at payment for medical 
services underlines this point even more sharply. One of the precepts to be 
passed on from master physician to students (in the presence of brahmins) 
states, “If you want to achieve success in your medical profession, earn wealth 
as well as fame and attain heaven after death. You should in all circumstances 
pay for the well-being of cows, brahmins, and all other living beings” (Caraka, 
Vi. 8.13). 
The fact that no term equivalent to ‘science’ emerged to frame both 
sides of this debate in the classical texts of the two parties illustrates a key 
point. Benavides suggests that ‘religion’ emerges historically as a category 
within which traditions or cultures can negotiate their similarities and 
differences; the opposition of ‘religion’ to ‘magic,’ for example, can function to 
reify the struggles for legitimacy that are implicit in such negotiations (2001; 
1997). Concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘magic,’ and ‘science’ can work in two directions, 
unitarily as umbrella terms encompassing the negotiation of similarly and 
difference, or differentially to claim legitimacy for one set of beliefs and 
practices over against another. In the present, ‘ayurvedic science’ must refer 
not to a foreshadowing of modernity but to the space of an abortive struggle 
for legitimacy in post-Vedic India. This recognizes both the tension between 
physicians and priests and the fact that the development of Ayurveda’s 
alternative worldview did not proceed to the point where ‘science’ emerged as 
a “realm within such differences becomes visible” (Benavides 2001, 106). 
Ayurveda appears to be ‘scientific,’ not in a modern sense, but in sense similar 
to that in which medieval alchemy came to be seen as ‘magical.’ The key issue 
was not the presence of empirical characteristics a worldview that seems truer 
or more objective nearly two millennia later. The important issue was rather 
that Ayurveda presented a competing worldview to the brahminic orthodoxy 
that was attempting to extend and consolidate its position in the post-Vedic 
economy of salvation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Classical Ayurveda was not scientific, in a modern western sense, 
despite claims to the contrary. It manifested a number of empirical 
characteristics, above all an emphasis on observation in diagnosis and 
therapy. It also produced a theoretical view of health and disease that 
privileged materialistic and this-worldly explanations. However, it did not 
manifest the defining characteristics of modern science: thoroughgoing 
materialism, purely empirical observation, experimentation, falsification of 
hypotheses and theories, rational quantification, a developed conception of 
proof, or logical concepts instantiating a scientific relation between theory and 
data. In addition, again despite claims to the contrary, Ayurveda lacked the 
social preconditions of modern science. 
Nor did Ayurveda clearly distinguished between what we would now 
call ‘science’ and ‘religion.’ The many religious and magical elements are not 
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necessarily extraneous, marginal, or inauthentic. Vedic metaphors of cooking 
and magical views, for example, are much more common than references to 
brahmins or appeals to brahminic concepts (e.g., moksa and Brahman), and 
the former are more closely integrated with empirical passages (e.g., Caraka, 
Su. 7, 1.41-43, Vi. 3.36, 8.6-8, Sa. 8.59-66, In. 1.3). Other magical and religious 
elements are too prominent, too intermingled with empirical passages, and 
too explicitly acknowledged as part of Ayurveda to allow them to be simply 
explained away. However, there does seem to be good reason to credit the 
claim that some of the religious elements of the classical ayurvedic texts were 
added by parties sympathetic with brahminic orthodoxy. Such passages are 
only a small portion of the non-empirical elements of the text, and they are 
relatively rare and confined.  
The entire issue of whether, or to what extent, Ayurveda was science or 
religion is misleading. Religion, magic, and science are not natural kinds. Why 
should we assume that these classical south Asian texts were ever intended to 
express the sort of unitary viewpoint suggested by these terms? Caraka states 
explicitly that holding rigorously to any single point of view leads to 
confusion: “Those who consider the varying controversial aspects of the truth 
as established facts go on moving in circles, like a person sitting on an oil 
press that moves round and round” (Su 25.26-28; cf. Larson 1987, 251). 
Appropriately, Caraka considers a dream of riding on the wheel of an oil press 
to be a symptom of impending insanity (Ni 7.6). 
‘Religion’ and ‘science’ are modern western concepts. As such, they 
have the potential to import normative and ideological issues into discussions 
of “science and religion” in non-western and/or non-modern cultures. 
Moreover, this empty game of conceptual categorization distracts attention 
from more relevant social and economic issues. Looking for parallels to 
modern science tends to privilege ancient ‘science’ over against its ‘religious’ 
background without attending closely enough to the struggle for legitimacy 
implicit in this recognition and negotiation of difference in post-Vedic India. 
In addition, once the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘science’ are recognized as 
framing struggles for legitimacy, it becomes harder to distinguish the 
historical struggles, allegedly the object of study, from struggles implicit in 
academic allegiances to theoretical perspectives and to their institutional 
affiliations (cf. Benavides 1997, 305, 330). Attempts to unveil science as the 
authentic core of Ayurveda participate themselves in struggles for legitimacy.  
Three practical points emerge that might be of value for studying 
science and religion in a non-western context. First, the attempt to clarify 
terms (e.g., ‘empirical’ and ‘rational’) forces us to work in a more reflective 
manner and to be more sensitive to issues of translation and 
commensurability (cf. Tambiah 1990, 111ff.). Second, we must go beyond 
categorizing phenomena simply as like or unlike western science. We can 
conclude, for example, that Ayurveda is empirical insofar as observation 
shapes diagnosis and therapeutic practice but not in the stronger sense that it 
leaves room for theory modification in the light of empirical anomalies. 
Moreover, this conclusion does not commit us to seeing empirical 
characteristics as excluding religious characteristics. Third, it is important to 
take account of social, economic, and ideological issues, allowing for a broader 
basis of comparison. Naively positivistic views of science and naturalistic or 
Christian-centered views of religion are clearly inadequate for historical and 
comparative work. 
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In the end, we are left with a reminder that terms such as ‘science,’ 
‘religion,’ and ‘magic’ involve many complex dimensions. They are not simple 
objective labels; rather, they frame a series of tensions between competing 
worldviews and academic perspectives. Comparative studies of science and 
religion in non-western cultures would be best served by attending to this 
complexity, lest we circle endlessly on the oil-press of rhetorical posturing. 
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i We must be wary of assuming that ‘Hinduism’ refers to one unified religious tradition 
(Sontheimer and Kulke 1989; cf. Brockington 1981). 
ii Except where noted, translations of Caraka are from the version of Ram Karan Sharma and 
Vaidya Bhagwan (1976-94) and those of Susruta are from the version of Kaviraj Kunja Lal 
Bhishagratna (1991). Priyavrat Sharma’s translation of Caraka (Sharma 1994) and Susruta 
(Sharma 1999), and Dominik Wujastyk’s selective translations of ayurvedic works (Wujastyk 
2003) were also consulted.  References to Caraka and Susruta are by book, chapter, and 
verse. The eight books of Caraka are Sutrasthanam (abbreviated as ‘Su’), Vimanasthanam 
(Vi), Nidanasthanam (Ni), Sarirasthanam (Sa), Indriyasthanam (In), Cikitsasthanam (Ci), 
Kalpasthanam (Ka), and Siddhisthanam (Si).  The six books of Susruta are Sutrasthanam 
(Su), Nidanasthanam (Ni), Sarirasthanam (Sa), Cikitsasthanam (Ci), Kalpasthanam (Ka), and 
Uttara-Tantra (Ut). For an overview of the wider range of classical ayurvedic literature see 
Jaggi 1973. For detailed summaries and discussions of historiographic issues see G. Jan 
Meulenbeld’s magisterial five-volume History of Indian Medical Literature (1999-2002). 
iii Sharma 1994 translates, “Hence it is illogical to say that only perception is there and 
nothing else.” 
iv For an overview of positivistic views of science and of epistemological and cultural 
critiques see Hacking 1983, Giere 1998, and Sardar 2000. 
v Dasgupta argues (intriguingly but not conclusively) that the influential Nyaya system of 
logic has its roots in Ayurveda (1932, 395-402; cf. Chattopadhyaya 1986, 33). 
Chattopadhyaya extends this claim, somewhat less plausibly, in arguing that the Vaisesika 
categories so central to Ayurveda originated in the medical schools as well (Chattopadhyaya 
1977, 142, 426). Hendrik Kern argued in 1896 that the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism have 
their roots in Caraka; a number of scholars have echoed his view, though more recent work 
discounts the claim (Zysk 1991, 38; cf. Zimmer 1948, 33 & 196 n.5).  G. Jan Meulenbeld 
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offers a useful summary of the secondary literature on these and related issues (1999, 109-
114, 336-345). 
vi This more general theoretical use of rasa (one of the Vaisesika qualities of matter) should 
be distinguished from the name for the first of the dhatus. 
vii See, for example, Caraka, Su. 1.68-69, 5.11, 14.25-26, 27.80, 27.218, Vi. 8.136, Sa 8.9; 
Susruta, Su. 45.18ff., 45.81-83, 46.47, 46.115, 46.132, Ci 1.82, 3.44-45, 5.13, 5.34, 9.22-23, 
10.15, 11.12, 23.15, 26.20-21. 
viii See, for example, Caraka, Su. 8.18, 25.28, Ni. 7.11, Vi. 8.6, 8.11-13, In. 12.71-80, Ci. 
9.94; Susruta, Su. 29.12, Ci. 24.78.  
ix Although eating cows was clearly problematic for the orthodox brahmins, this wasn’t 
necessarily true for the Vedic tradition. There are suggestions in the Rg Veda that cows were 
eaten at least on special occasions such as marriages (Srinivasan 1979, 19, 73; cf. Wolpert 
1989, 28). This reinforces the possibility that, even in allowing consumption of beef, 
Ayurveda developed in continuity with Vedic tradition. 
x Max Weber’s deterministic and socially conservative view of karma has left a distorted 
legacy: “the inescapable on-rolling karma causality is in harmony with the eternity of the 
world, of life, and, above all, the caste order” (Weber 1958a, 121). Ayurveda is the clearest 
counter-example to Weber’s overly deterministic view of karma (cf. Weiss 1980). For other 
more nuanced South Asian views of karma see Doniger 1980 and Keyes and Daniel 1983. 
xi E.g., “disorders which are not corresponding to the vitiation of dosas are found to have been 
caused by the wrath of god etc.” (Caraka Sa. 6.27, trans. Sharma 1994). 
xii It would be misleading, of course, to search for a modern Western sense of ‘self’ in 
Ayurveda. A number of studies have explored aspects of distinctly different dimensions of 
self-perception, self-formation, and social agency in modern South Asian cultures (Derné 
1995, Roland 1991, Trawick 1990, Daniel 1987, Carrithers et al. 1986, Ostor et al. 1982, 
Kakar 1978). 
xiii On orientalism see Tibawi 1964, Said 1979, Inden 1986. 
xiv To define ‘science’ purely in terms of theory, method, data, and their mutual relation (e.g., 
materialism, reductionism, replication, falsification) neatly sidesteps the question of science’s 
relation to power. It also fails to capture other important dimensions (e.g., social organization 
and context, implications of the concept of progress, relations to means of production and 
distribution, cf. Bernal 1965, 1: 27-57). It is especially important to consider social and 
economic dimensions of science, in addition to its distinctive world-view, in discussions of 
non-western science (Jamison 1994).  
xv Some scholars argue that Hinduism was not just reshaped but invented during these 
nineteenth-century developments (e.g., Frykenberg 1989; cf. Halbfass 1988, 192, 260, 340) 
and also by the later consolidation of the field of comparative religion (e.g., Fitzgerald 1990; 
2000, 134ff.). 
xvixvi In this way, the search for science in Ayurveda parallels nineteenth-century Indian 
reclamations of a ‘rational’ religious tradition. After a long period of mixture with Islamic and 
folk-medical traditions, including a greater emphasis on spiritual elements, Ayurveda 
underwent a process of “secularization” in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Leslie 
1976, 360). Arguments concerning the scientific nature of Ayurveda echo this period when 
“the Hindu élite relocated science’s authority in its ‘use in this world’, not in its signification 
as a mark of western superiority” (Prakash 1996, 81). 
xvii Sharma translates “the wise physician should abide by the advice of the priest” (1999, 
323). 
xviii Chattopadhyaya argues that the esteem of physicians was high, then dropped sharply as 
brahminic orthodoxy emerged. This allows him to paint the orthodox “counter-ideology” as 
the arch-enemy of scientific Ayurveda (1977, 232ff.). Zysk, however, counters that 
“Chattopadhyaya wrongly concluded that physicians in the early Vedic period were highly 
esteemed, an error resulting from his sole reliance on mythological references in the Rgveda 
rather than a more comprehensive picture....” (Zysk 1991, 22).   
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xix There is another way in which this argument for the marginalization of physicians fails to 
consider possible alternative explanations. The view that Ayurveda emerged in opposition to 
and was later absorbed or repressed by brahminic orthodoxy considers only external 
influences. However, counter to Zysk’s view, it is arguable that Ayurveda (like the religious 
traditions with which it was allegedly in competition) failed to establish itself as an 
independent empirical tradition because it lacked the proper social conditions. Max Weber 
argued that modern empirical science emerged after a long history of rationalization 
processes, primarily of the world-views of salvation religions. A certain type of rationality, a 
certain way of consistently motivating action, was characteristic of this historical trajectory. 
In Weber’s terms, Ayurveda manifested practical but not substantive rationality: orienting 
action with reference to individual interests not overriding normative principles (cf. Kalberg 
1980, 1164-1165). Ayurveda is inner-worldly but not ascetic: it seeks a long life of healthy 
happiness, but no larger goal demands allegiance. For Weber, only substantive rationality can 
provide the necessary conditions for institutionalization of values and for the resulting 
maintenance of a methodical way of life. That is, for a world-view to become established it 
needs a shared firmament of values to link beliefs and interests to social actions in a 
sustainable way. Lacking this, Ayurveda did not possess the necessary internal conditions to 
survive as an independent empirical tradition. It did not provide a framework of values that 
could serve as a motivational locus for people to organize their actions and lives around. On 
this view, Zysk’s “hinduization” process was, perhaps, not a result of conflict but of a lack of 
adequate social and moral conditions for stability and continuation. Ironically, from a 
Weberian perspective, Ayurveda may have suffered from an absence of rationality. 
